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Each action has sensory consequences that need to be dis-
tinguished from sensations arising from the environment.
This is accomplished by the comparing of internal predic-
tions about these consequences with the actual afference,
thereby isolating the afferent component that is self-pro-
duced [1–4]. Because the sensory consequences of actions
vary as a result of changes of the effector’s efficacy, internal
predictions need to be updated continuously and on a short
time scale. Here, we tested the hypothesis that this updating
of predictions about the sensory consequences of actions is
mediated by the cerebellum, a notion that parallels the cere-
bellum’s role in motor learning [5–8]. Patients with cerebellar
lesions and their matched controls were equally able to de-
tect experimental modifications of visual feedback about
their pointing movements. When such feedback was con-
stantly rotated, both groups instantly attributed the visual
feedback to their own actions. However, in interleaved trials
without actual feedback, patients did no longer account for
this feedback rotation—neither perceptually nor with re-
spect to motor performance. Both deficits can be explained
by an impaired updating of internal predictions about the
sensory consequences of actions caused by cerebellar pa-
thology. Thus, the cerebellum guarantees both precise per-
formance and veridical perceptual interpretation of actions.
Results
Motor behavior has implications for perception because our
actions are a rich source of sensory information. This self-pro-
duced information needs to be distinguished from sensory
events caused by external sources. It is thereby ensured that
we are able to attribute self-agency to self-produced informa-
tion [1, 4, 9, 10] and that this information is not perceived as
part of the external environment [4, 11, 12]. In order to isolate
external sensory stimuli, the afference is compared with an in-
ternal prediction about the sensory consequences of one’s
own behavior. In the case of a match, the afference is inter-
preted as a result of our own actions. In the case of a mismatch,
the difference corresponds to an external sensory event [1, 13,
14]. Importantly, internal predictions build on signals related to
movements, such as an efference copy of the motor command
[1, 2] or proprioception. However—unlike the latter
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the same movement can have different sensory conse-
quences: movements are performed in variable sensory envi-
ronments, with sensory systems that can alter and with ef-
fectors whose efficacy can change. Hence, the perceptual
consequences of self-motion can only be assessed by an in-
ternal predictor reflecting these ever-changing properties.
Two reasons suggest that that the cerebellum might be the
ideal substrate to form such internal predictions. First, an inter-
nal predictor requires knowledge about the efficacy of behav-
ior. Such knowledge is available in an organ intimately involved
in motor control [15, 16]. Second, internal predictions need
adjustment in a way that is similar to the adjustment afforded
by cerebellar motor learning [5–8, 17] and that therefore could
depend on comparable computational principles.
Human imaging experiments and recordings from the cere-
bellum-like structure of electric fish have lent support to this
notion by identifying cerebellar activity that correlated with
predictions about the sensory consequences of motor acts
[18, 19] and by implying that this correlate is adaptable [20,
21]. However, there remains an open question of whether the
cerebellum just exhibits correlated activity or is causally in-
volved in the representation of sensory predictions and—in
the latter case—whether it generates or optimizes these
predictions. Finally, if the cerebellum would optimize internal
predictions, would there be a transfer of learning from the per-
ceptual domain to the motor domain?
To address these questions, we studied patients with cere-
bellar lesions and their age-matched controls (Table S1, avail-
able online). In a series of two experiments, subjects were
required to perform out-and-back pointing movements in
a virtual-reality setup in complete darkness (Figure 1A; refer
to the Supplemental Experimental Procedures, available on-
line). This setup allowed subjects to be provided with visual
feedback about the position of their index finger in real time.
Feedback was accurate, altered, or lacking. The first experi-
ment tested whether the two groups (n = 14) could predict
the visual consequences of pointing. The second experiment
tested whether for constantly altered visual feedback both
groups (n = 12; each group) were able to update internal pre-
dictions about the new visual consequences of their behavior
and, moreover, to recruit these updated predictions to opti-
mize motor performance.
Experiment 1
Subjects were instructed to perform pointing movements in
the table plane with their right index finger and to move as
straight and quickly as possible (Figure 1B). Pointing distance
was indicated by a briefly flashed circle (300 ms), which was
centered on the starting position of the hand (9 radius). There
was no visual target for the pointing movement. Rather, sub-
jects were free to choose any position on the upper right seg-
ment of the circle as a goal for their reaches. The position of the
index finger was fed back to the subjects throughout each trial.
Feedback was rotated by varying degrees around the starting
point of the movement in a clockwise or counterclockwise di-
rection. After having completed their pointing movement, sub-
jects reported the direction of the perceived rotation of visual
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(A) Experimental setup. Subjects viewed the vir-
tual image of their finger on the feedback monitor
via a mirror (solid orange line) while performing
out-and-back pointing movements with their
right hand. The virtual image appeared as lying
in the same plane as their actual finger (red solid
arrow: actual movement vector; white solid
arrow: rotated visual feedback).
(B) Paradigm of experiment 1. Online visual feed-
back (white disc) about pointing (red circle) was
either rotated in a counterclockwise (ccw) or—
as in this example—in a clockwise (cw) direction.
Dotted lines indicate the movement trajectory
and the respective feedback. PD denotes the ac-
tual pointing direction, and a, p, l, and r denote
anterior (90), posterior, left, and right (0), re-
spectively. Subjects’ task was to indicate the
direction of rotated visual feedback in a two-
alternative forced-choice manner by pressing one
of two buttons with their left hand.
(C and D) Group results. There was no significant
difference between groups with respect to the
point of subjective equivalence between the
actual and the perceived pointing directions (C)
and the just noticeable difference between these
perceived directions (D). Both results indicate
a preserved ability of patients to detect visual
feedback manipulations by resorting to intact in-
ternal predictions for familiar actions. Bars depict
means calculated across subjects (6 95% confi-
dence intervals, uncorrected).feedback with respect to their actual movement in a two-alter-
native forced choice manner: they reported their decision by
pressing one of two buttons with either the left index finger
(clockwise) or the left middle finger (counterclockwise). The
amount of rotation in individual trials was determined by three
randomly interleaved staircase procedures [22]. Two pro-
cedures estimated the detection thresholds (75% hits) for
perceived clockwise and counterclockwise feedback mani-
pulations, respectively. The ‘‘just noticeable difference’’ of
feedback deviation reflects the mean of these two detection
thresholds. A third staircase procedure was used to titrate
the ‘‘point of subjective equivalence’’ between perceived
movement and visual feedback. At this point subjects re-
sponded at chance level (Figure S1). Because subjects’
choices critically depended on a comparison of the actual vi-
sual feedback with the predicted visual action outcome, both
the point of subjective equivalence and the just noticeable dif-
ference can be considered indirect measures of the accuracy
of internal predictions.
Both groups showed a clockwise bias of the point of subjec-
tive equivalence toward the side of the effector. More impor-
tantly, between both groups there was no significant differ-
ence in the point of subjective equivalence (see Figure 1C) or
in the just noticeable difference (see Figure 1D). Finally, the
variability of the two perceptual estimates was identical in
the two groups (F test). In summary, experiment 1 indicates
that patients were impaired neither in their generating of accu-
rate internal predictions nor in their matching of them with
visual feedback (e.g., secondary to potential oculomotor
deficits [23]).
Experiment 2
In experiment 2, we asked whether subjects were able to
perceptually adapt to altered sensory consequences of their
pointing movements by recalibrating internal predictions.Moreover, we tested whether they would exploit updated in-
ternal predictions to optimize motor performance. As in exper-
iment 1, the basic task of subjects was to carry out pointing
movements with their right index finger. After each movement,
they had to give a perceptual estimate about their perceived
pointing direction by placing a mouse-guided cursor into the
respective direction with the use of their left hand. Three differ-
ent experimental conditions were presented in a randomly
interleaved manner. (1) During ‘‘feedback trials,’’ subjects
received visual feedback about their movements, which
induced and maintained adaptation. This condition allowed
us to compare subjects’ perception of self-action (indicated
by their perceived pointing direction) with their actual motor
behavior (indicated by their actual pointing direction) while
both external visual feedback and internal predictions about
the expected feedback were available (see Figure 2A). During
the preadaptation phase, this feedback was kept veridical to
get a baseline estimate of the perceived pointing direction. In
the ‘‘adaptation buildup phase,’’ we gradually increased the
feedback rotation angle in steps of 26 (clockwise) over five
consecutive trials. After this build-up, rotation was kept con-
stant at 230 (clockwise). This postadaptation phase allowed
us to maintain adaptation. Two types of probe trials were ran-
domly interleaved with the feedback trials, the first type tested
for recalibration of internal predictions (‘‘perceptual probe tri-
als’’) and the second type for changes in motor performnce
(‘‘motor probe trials’’). For further illustration of the course of
experiment 2, please refer to Figure 2D. (2) The perceptual
probe trials were identical to feedback trials except that no vi-
sual feedback was provided at all (see Figure 2B). This condi-
tion allowed us to detect whether the new visual feedback in
feedback trials was used to update internal predictions about
pointing direction, since, in the absence of visual feedback,
visual estimates of perceived pointing critically depended on
internal predictions. (3) During motor probe trials, subjects
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(A–D) Experimental conditions of experiment 2.
The top row of panels A–C shows a graphical
illustration of each of our experimental condi-
tions. These illustrations also indicate the ex-
pected effects of adaptation on a control popula-
tion [9]: if subjects were constantly provided
rotated visual feedback ([A], colored arm) with re-
spect to their actual pointing movements (gray
arm), controls would tend to perceive their arm
as pointing into the direction of visual feedback.
Even without visual feedback (B), controls would
continue to perceive their arm as pointing into
the same visual direction (A). They would have in-
ternalized the new visual consequences associ-
ated with this particular action. Finally, if asked
to reach for a specific visual target (apple) without
visual feedback (C), controls would reach in a di-
rection opposite to the feedback rotation in order
to account for the altered internal prediction
about the visual consequences of their move-
ment. If the cerebellum were to play a key role in
the updating of such internal predictions, one
would expect to see a specific deficit of patients
in the updating of both their perceived pointing di-
rection (PPD) and their actual pointing direction
(PD) in conditions that critically depend on accu-
rate internal predictions, i.e., in (B) and (C), re-
spectively. The bottom row of panels A–C depicts
the three different experimental paradigms that
were used to drive adaptation and to assess its ef-
fects on both perception (PPD) and action (PD).
Conditions were presented in randomly inter-
leaved trials, in which subjects performed
out-and-back pointing movements (exemplary
pointing direction, dotted red line). After each
movement subjects had to indicate their per-
ceived pointing direction with the use of
a mouse-guided visual cursor (solid gray arrow).
(A) In feedback trials subjects received veridical
online visual feedback about the peripheral part
of their hand movement within a first block of
100 trials, i.e., the preadaptation phase. Afterward,
feedback was spatially rotated in order to induce
adaptation. The feedback angle x was gradually
increased during the buildup phase and remained
constant during the postadaptation phase
(x = 230; white dotted line). Visual feedback of
the first half of the trajectory was blocked by an in-
visible black mask of 4.5 diameter (white dashed
circle) to diminish subjects’ overall exposure to
feedback and to limit the possibility of online motor corrections (for detailed discussion, see [9]). (B) In perceptual probe trials, subjects received no visual feed-
back at all. (C) In motor probe trials, an explicit target (red circle) was briefly flashed and subjects had to perform a pointing movement toward the remembered
target location, again while no visual feedback was present. A detailed time course of experiment 2 is depicted in (D), which indicates the share of each exper-
imental condition and also specifies x, namely the angle of visual feedback rotation, for each of the different stages of adaptation.
(E)Group results. Both patients andcontrols showed a comparable, highly significant adaptation of their perceived pointing direction as long asvisual feedback
was present (feedback trials). However, in the absence of visual feedback, this adaptation of the perceived pointing direction was significantly smaller in pa-
tients than in controls (perceptual probe trials). Moreover, patients showed a significantly reduced compensatory motor adjustment (motor probe trials; figure
conventions as in Figure 1).made a pointing movement toward a visual target that was
briefly flashed randomly at one of four possible positions
(90, 60, 30, or 0; see Figure 2C). Because no visual feed-
back was given, this condition allowed us to test whether sub-
jects could internally guide pointing in such a way that it would
account for the new visual consequences. Figures 2A–2C pro-
vide graphical illustrations of the parameters tested and depict
the expected effects of adaptation on each of these parame-
ters [9].
When visual feedback was constantly altered in the posta-
daptation phase, both groups showed a significant shift of their
perceived pointing direction in feedback trials as compared tothe preadaptation phase (see Figure 2E; also, refer to Figure S2
for individual examples). Because there was no significant
difference in the size of the perceptual shift between groups,
both were equally able to draw on visual feedback to adjust
perception of self-action.
However, when visual information was absent (perceptual
probe trials) both groups still adapted, but the change of per-
ceived pointing direction was significantly smaller in patients
as compared to controls (see Figure 2E). In the control group,
the perceptual changes in feedback trials and in perceptual
probe trials were statistically indistinguishable, thus demon-
strating that the altered perceptual estimate builds on an
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817internal prediction about the expected visual consequences of
pointing, a prediction that got recalibrated by new visual feed-
back [9]. In contrast, patients adapted significantly less in per-
ceptual probe trials as compared to feedback trials—a percep-
tual deficit that reveals the insufficient recalibration of their
internal predictions. Importantly, given that patients’ esti-
mates of the perceived pointing direction during the postadap-
tation phase were stable and did not show any residual buildup
(regression analysis; p > 0.05), this perceptual deficit cannot
simply be explained by an assumption of longer time con-
stants for learning in the patient group.
Although feedback trials required subjects to develop a co-
herent percept of self-action despite conflicting internal and
external information about movement, they did not require
subjects to adapt motor performance. However, controls ex-
hibited a compensatory adjustment of pointing in motor probe
trials despite the lack of visual feedback, indicating that they
‘‘optimized’’ motor performance by recruiting updated internal
predictions. Specifically, the difference between the actual
pointing direction and the position of the flashed target
showed a significant, adaptation-induced increase, compara-
ble in size but opposite in direction to the changes in the per-
ceptual probe trials (see Figure 2E). The patient group, how-
ever, did not show a significant motor adjustment, and the
amount of change was significantly smaller. These findings re-
veal the failure of patients to modify motor control by the use
of updated internal predictions about the visual consequences
of action.
Finally, there is preliminary evidence that the learning defi-
cits observed in this study are caused by disorders of cerebel-
lar domains ipsilateral to the effector. In two patients with uni-
lateral cerebellar lesions who were subsequently tested with
both their right and their left hand, the results for the ipsile-
sional side and the contralesional side qualitatively resembled
the results for patients and controls, respectively (see
Figure S3).
Discussion
Our results extend the classical view of the cerebellum as a site
of motor learning by showing that it likewise is a major site of
perceptual learning. More specifically, they suggest that the
cerebellum is responsible for rapidly updating internal predic-
tions about the visual consequences of motor behavior in
order to inform the perception of self-action.
Patients’ ability to predict the visual consequences of a well-
learned task (experiment 1) ruled out the possibility that a more
general sensory or motor deficit could account for our results.
Moreover, the fact that patients were able to draw on visual
feedback to estimate their own behavior (experiment 2) shows
an intact integration of conflicting visual and proprioceptive
cues for the multimodal interpretation of self-motion. Only
when visual feedback was no longer available did patients
differ from controls, in that they were impaired in (1) the updat-
ing of a visual estimate of the direction of pointing and in (2)
adjustment of their movements accordingly.
Specifically, in comparison of the preadaptation and the
postadaptation phases, one and the same movement was per-
ceived differently by the controls. This was indicated by a shift
of the perceived pointing direction that occurred whether or
not visual feedback was present. Given that both propriocep-
tive inputs and motor commands were the same for the same
movement, it could not be a change in proprioception or in
efference copy per se that accounted for this alteredinterpretation of self-motion. Hence, there must be a change
in an internal representation that relates these internal sources
of self-motion information to the new visual consequences of
pointing, namely a plastic internal predictor [9]. The signifi-
cantly reduced modification of patients’ perceived pointing di-
rection in trials without visual feedback thus reflects a specific
deficit in updating of internal predictions, which is caused by
cerebellar pathology.
With respect to motor control, patients and monkeys with
cerebellar lesions still exhibit adequate motor behavior in
tasks that they have been well trained to perform [7], suggest-
ing some compensatory mechanisms in the case of chronic
lesion [5, 24]. In contrast, both species show deficits in the
adapting of behavior on a short time scale [5, 7, 8]. As shown
here, the same principles apply for internal predictions sup-
porting the perception of self-action. Thus, our findings might
not only specify cerebellar contributions to perceptual and
cognitive functions [25–27] but also support the idea of the cer-
ebellum’s uniform contribution to both perception and action:
the cerebellum integrates motor and sensory information in or-
der to predict the consequences of behavior—not only to fine
tune movement (e.g., [5–7]) but also to inform the perception of
self-action [3, 16, 28]. This is achieved by exploiting of the
difference between a predicted-state estimate and an actual-
state estimate, which results in a prediction error. The cerebel-
lum acts to reduce this error by recalibrating the internal pre-
diction on a short time scale. In other words, the cerebellum
forms a ‘‘new’’ or ‘‘updated’’ internal model of the conse-
quences of behavior [3, 6, 16], whereas the long term represen-
tation of internal models might be realized elsewhere [21, 29].
Internal predictions could serve as ‘‘internal feedback sig-
nals’’ for action [16] and for action perception. They would
allow precise perceptual estimates and performance even in
situations with delayed or missing sensory feedback. If internal
predictions were not optimized accordingly, both perception
and action would no longer be accurate in such situations.
In fact, patients were able to provide accurate perceptual esti-
mates, but only as long as visual feedback was available and
as long as they didn’t have to rely on updated internal predic-
tions (experiment 2).
We further assessed changes in subjects’ motor perfor-
mance in experiment 2. In randomly interleaved motor probe
trials subjects had to point at a flashed visual target. However,
there was no visual feedback that would have allowed subjects
to estimate pointing accuracy in order to optimize their behav-
ior. Thus, any adaptation-induced change of pointing could
not be directly explained by a ‘‘visual error signal’’ or any cor-
rective movement [30], which were both lacking. Rather, sub-
jects could adjust performance solely on the basis of updated
internal predictions. Control subjects showed an adaptation-
induced change in pointing direction that was equal in size
but opposite in direction to the changes in perceived pointing
direction. Hence, they performed a compensatory movement
that exactly accounted for the new visual action conse-
quences captured by their internal predictions. Accordingly,
patients were impaired in the optimization of motor control be-
cause of the lack of updated internal sensory predictions. This
is further corroborated by the fact that an altered perceptual
interpretation of self-action in the presence of visual feedback
was not sufficient to alter motor behavior per se. Our hypoth-
esis is in good agreement with recent studies suggesting
that a sensory predictor could be used to train a motor control-
ler [31, 32] and that a cerebellar prediction of the visual conse-
quences of movement might be used to guide motor planning
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to build on these updated predictions implies a major ecolog-
ical importance and a rather universal character of the cerebel-
lar mechanism described.
Supplemental Data
Experimental procedures, patients’ characteristics (Table S1), and figures
illustrating the course of experiment 1 (Figure S1) and the time course of ad-
aptation in two exemplary subjects (Figure S2), as well as the effects of lat-
eralized cerebellar lesions in experiment 2 (Figure S3) are available with this
article online at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/18/11/
814/DC1/.
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